Incentives and promotion in wage hierarchies by Dilmé, Francesc
                   DOCUMENTS DE TREBALL 
  DE LA FACULTAT DE CIÈNCIES                       
ECONÒMIQUES I EMPRESARIALS 
 
                        Col·lecció d’Economia  
E07/185 
 
 
 
Incentives and Promotion 
in Wage Hierarchies 
 
 
Francesc Dilmé 
 
 
 
 
Adreça correspondència: 
Departament de Teoria Econòmica 
Facultat de Ciències Econòmiques i Empresarials 
Universitat de Barcelona 
Av. Diagonal 690, 
08034 Barcelona, Spain 
Email: f.dilme@lse.ac.uk 
 
 
 
 
Abstract: Most of the large firms organization schemes consist in hierarchical structures of 
tiers with different wage levels. Traditionally the existence of this kind of organizations has 
been associated to the separation of productive and managerial or supervision tasks and to 
differences in the skills of the workers. However, many firms now employ workers with 
similar skills, and then the hierarchical structure can be related to an incentive scheme to 
ensure that workers supply effort. The model we present investigates how firm owners 
should determine the optimal wage distribution in order to maximize profits. 
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Resum: La majoria d’esquemes organitzatius en empreses consisteixen en estrucures 
jeràrquiques de diferents nivells amb differents nivells salarials. Tradicionalment 
l’existència d’aquest tipus d’esquemes organitzatius s’ha associat a la separció de tasques 
de gestió o supervisió i a diferències d’habilitats entre treballadors. Tot i això, actualment 
hi ha moltes empreses que contracten treballadors amb habilitats semblants, i aleshores 
l’estructura jeràrquica es pot relacionar a un esquema d’incentius per assegurar que els 
treballadors s’esforcen. El model que presentem invesiga com els propietaris de les 
empreses haurinen de determinar l’estructura de salaris òptima per tal de maximitzar els 
beneficis. 
Paraules clau: Salaris d’eficiència, jerarquies òptimes, esquemes d’incentius, risc moral. 
 
1 Introduction
The classic economic principles that date back to the period of Ricardo (1817) state
that the wage earned by a worker in a free market economy should represent as
closely as possible his or her marginal production. This statement is valid when it
is easy to calculate the marginal product of a worker and there are few management
tasks, which is the case in small firms, for example. Nowadays a large portion of
the working population is employed by large firms, which often operate internation-
ally and have thousands of employees around the world. In fact, many economic
historians, such as Chandler (1962), have written that a significant proportion of
the economic development over the last few centuries has been driven by large-scale
organizations, some of them with hundreds of thousands of employees. In these
large firms the wage is usually contracted before performance can be analyzed and
all employees at the same level earn the same wage regardless of the effort supplied.
The production of these large firms depends on the effort supplied by their em-
ployees, which is often a hidden action that is not easily observed by the owners.
This can encourage employees to lower their performance. Dickens, Katz, Lang
and Summers (1989) present extensive evidence of the impact of worker shirking
in American firms. Akerlof and Yellen (1990) show the correlation between worker
effort and influences such as anger, jealousy and gratitude. In most of the moral
hazard literature it is assumed that the cost of supervising the effort supplied by the
employees is relatively high. This generates a situation of asymmetric information
between the firm owner and the employee, in which only the employee knows the
effort he or she supplies, the ”hidden action”. Effort, as a non-measurable variable,
cannot usually be included in contracts between principal and agent. The creation
of incentive mechanisms to increase the effort supplied by the agents in order to be
competitive is an important issue for large firms.
One possible way of motivating the workforce to supply effort is through pun-
ishment schemes, which try to detect and penalize shirking, commonly referred to
as ”stick schemes”. Models such as the one proposed by Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984)
are used when firms have limited monitoring capabilities and incentive workers to
maintain performance by applying a stochastic process that detects probability rates
of shirking. Qian (1994), following the work of Calvo and Wellisz (1978, 1979), de-
veloped a model of optimal hierarchical organization, treating hierarchies as super-
visory schemes in which the bottom tier of the firm consists of production workers
and the remaining tiers are structured as a system in which every agent supervises
the agents in the tier immediately below them. This vision is far from realistic in
current firms, particularly those in the service sector, where the tasks performed
by agents in the upper tiers of the hierarchy are diverse and often not specifically
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related to monitoring the effort supplied by agents in lower tiers. Moreover, it is
usually difficult to prove irrefutably that a worker has been shirking continuously,
and without such proof there are no legal grounds for dismissal.
The other possible way of ensuring worker effort is to introduce positive incen-
tives, which are commonly known as ”carrot schemes”. Holmstrom (1982) formalized
the model devised by Alchian and Demsetz (1972) for optimal contracts in cases of
moral hazard in teams, which considers the firm to be a team for which only the
aggregate output is observable. In addition, Tirole (1986) developed collusion-proof
contracts, which are designed to prevent collusion among agents or between super-
visors and workers. These models are interesting in contract theory, but they do
not establish the hierarchical structure of firms and some types of contract are not
permitted by law.
In large firms, which usually have highly hierarchical structures, the agents usu-
ally have a stronger incentive to work: promotion. In fact, the structure of many
large firms is based on different tiers with increasing wages. The potential for higher
future salaries provides workers with strong incentives to supply effort, particularly
when there is considerable competition among workers to secure promotion. This
type of incentive-based wage structure usually implies that agents will be payed be-
low their marginal production in the lower tiers and above their marginal production
in the higher tiers. In fact, there are many firms in which the large wage increases
from one tier to the next make it barely conceivable that the productivity of an
agent who gains promotion increases with wage, as Medoff and Abraham (1980)
document. Moreover, it is often possible to find highly skilled workers in the job
market or in lower tiers who are capable of supplying similar productivity to agents
in high tiers for lower wages, but firms do not lower the wages of workers in higher
tiers in order to maintain incentives for agents in lower tiers. Doeringer and Piore
(1971) show that a high proportion of those in higher-paid jobs have been promoted
from lower-paid jobs within the same organization.
In this paper I propose a model based on the observable behavior of firms and
agents. I assume that when there is a vacancy in a certain tier on the salary ladder
there is a lottery among the agents in the lower tier to occupy this vacancy. The
individual probability of winning this lottery depends on the effort supplied. Then,
the mechanism that incentive agents to supply effort is competition among agents
to be promoted. The Nash equilibrium re
The paper is organized in four sections. After this introduction, the second sec-
tion describes the general the model by analyzing the production, the probability
of being promoted and the moral hazard involved. The third section presents the
symmetric Nash equilibrium solution. The fourth section contains several compar-
isons of previous results, focusing particularly on two specific cases and the different
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scales of the problem. This section is also used to address inequality issues. Finally,
we present the conclusions that can be obtained from the results presented.
2 The model
2.1 Production
Let’s first establish the production side of the firm. We assume that the firm,
through the effort of the agents, produces a homogeneous product, that is sold at
a nominal price p > 0 taken as given by the firm. We also assume that there are
no other production costs than the wages paid to the agents. This assumption is
equivalent to assume that the costs other than the wages are proportional to the
production, and the net revenue of every unit of good is its price. The firm owner,
then, have as nominal revenue the overall production of the firm multiplied by the
price of this product, and the wages paid to the workers as costs.
We assume that the firm organization consists in Q ∈ N jobs grouped in N ≤ Q
subsets or tiers. We also assume that every tier has a large number of jobs given
by Qn, and has an associated wage, wn, with n = 1, ..., N . We assume that the
wages are arranged in rising order, w1 ≤ ... ≤ wN . At every instant of time Q
individuals, called agents, belong to the firm, and occupy one and only one job.
Every job belongs to one tier, and then
∑N
n=1Qn = Q. We assume that the wages
that the firm owner can establish have a lower limit, given by a minimum wage wb.
This minimum wage can be established by the government, for example through
minimum wage law, or by the market, for example as an opportunity cost of the
agents.
Every agent can supply an effort given by1 λi ∈ R+. We assume that the produc-
tion depends linearly on the effort and the productivity of the jobs of the tier where
the agent works. The real productivity per unity of effort worked by an agent of the
tier n will be noted by An, thus the production of an agent in the tier n supplying
an effort λi is An.λ
i. The nominal productivity is given by the product of the real
productivity times the price of the good. The overall nominal production Y n will
be given by the following function
Y n =
N∑
n=1
p.An.λ¯n.Qn ,
1From now we note R+ as the non negative reals, including the 0. For the moment we assume
en effort without upper bound, that can seen non realistic, but as we will see it will be naturally
bounded.
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where λ¯n is the average effort supplied by the agents in the tier n. Because the firm
owner can not observe the effort supplied by the agents, he/she pays the same wage
to all the agents in a single tier regardless the effort they supply. Then, the nominal
production costs Cn are given by
Cn =
N∑
n=1
wn.Qn .
The nominal profits of the firm are given by the nominal production minus the
nominal costs. Then, the profits function P n is given by the following formula:
P n = Y n − Cn =
N∑
n=1
(p.An.λ¯n − wn).Qn .
The firm owner faces the problem of maximize this nominal profits function. In
general he/she will set the wages of all existing tiers, the constraint being that they
mist be higher or equal than the minimum wage wb. In addition, we will consider
the case where the firm owner can also choose the firm organization, that is, the
number of agents in each tier {Qn}, and maximize the profits optimizing also these
numbers. In general, the firm owner cannot decide the average effort of each tier,
because every agent decides the effort he/she supplies and it can not be observed.
However, it can influence their decisions through changes in the incentives of being
promoted, changing the wages and modifying the firm organization.
All of the nominal variables presented here can be translated to the real analogous
variables simply by dividing them by the general price level of the economy. We will
consider that the production of the firm represents a small proportion of the overall
production of the specific type of goods, which in turn represents only a small portion
of the consumer basket. Thus, changes in the price of the product without changes
in nominal wages will not affect the real wages of the firmG˙s workers. Nevertheless,
when we consider the overall economy and aggregate production later in the paper,
the price of the aggregate production will represent the general price level, in which
case the real variables will be strongly dependent on the price.
2.2 Probability of promotion
We assume that the agents employed by the firm can leave it, a process that will
be called “death”. An agent can “die” in the literal sense, but also by reaching
retirement age or deciding to move to another firm. We use a simplifying assumption
that the death rate is the same for all agents working in the firm, regardless of age
or the tier to which they belong. Then, the process of dying can be treated as a
stochastic exponential process with a constant rate, which is represented by d. At
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any point of time, the probability that an agent will O`surviveO´ for a period of τ
from the present is e−d.τ . When τ = ∆tt is small, the probability of death can be
approximated by d.∆t. The life expectancy of every agent in the firm is 1/d.
When an agent employed by the firm dies, he/she leaves a vacancy in the re-
spective tier. We assume that this vacancy can only be occupied by an agent from
the tier immediately below, through a selection process that will be discussed later
in the paper. We also assume that the agents can not be demoted or fired.2 Then,
vacancies in any tier can only arise due to the promotion of an agent from to the
tier immediately above or due to the death of an agent in the tier. This implies that
the death of an agent belonging to a certain tier produces a cascade effect in which
there is a chain of promotion from all lower tiers. When there is a vacancy in the
lowest tier, tier 1, the firm automatically hires another worker.
We assume that the process of filling the vacancies is instantaneous. This as-
sumption ensures that the number of agents in each level is always constant. The
automatic hiring of a new agent can be understood as the existence of a minimum
wage set by the government and a pool of unemployed agents willing to work for
the wage w1 ≥ wb In this case, we can assume that their reserve utility is suffciently
low that they will immediately accept a job in the firm. Another possibility is to
assume a reserve utility established by the opportunity available to agents in the
labor market. We can then assume that there is no minimum wage and that the
only restriction on wages is that they should be non-negative. The results in this
case are similar to a government-established minimum wage, and we will obviate
this case.
We will now consider the probability of promotion in a given tier. One agent
will be promoted when a vacancy arises in the next tier. In general, the probability
rate3 of one vacancy in a certain tier will be constant. In fact, it is easy to show
that when the death rate is constant, the number of deaths of agents in tiers above
a specific tier follows a Poisson process, with constant probability rates. We use qn
to denote the probability rate of a vacancy arising due to a promotion in tier n. The
condition of replacing all of the agents that leave tier n is given by:
0 = Q˙n = −
dien︷︸︸︷
d.Qn−
upgn︷ ︸︸ ︷
qn.Qn+
upgn−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
qn−1.Qn−1 .
This condition states that in order to maintain the number of agents in each tier n,
the number of agents promoted from tier n to tier n+1 plus the number of agents in
2Examples of the impossibility of fire workers are the functionaries, that can not be fired except
in extreme cases, and labor laws that do not allow to fire workers except when there are irrefutable
proofs of their shirking, that are difficult to obtain.
3As in the process of dying, the relevant concept is the probability rate and not the probability
itself. It is due we are considering the probability of being update per unity of time.
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this tier who die must be the same as the number of agents promoted from tier n−1
to tier n. Note that only the agents in the tier immediately below can occupy the
vacancy, and not agents in lower tiers or higher tiers. From the previous equation
we can express the promotion rate of a given tier with respect the promotion rate
of the following tier. We obtain the following expression:
qn−1 =
(d+ qn).Qn
Qn−1
. (2.1)
When the structure of the firm is finite with N tiers, the probability rate of promo-
tion for the top tier, qN , must be 0. For a given organizational structure, i.e. for
given values of Qn, and a probability rate of death d, the relation (2.1) establishes a
recurrence for the promotion rates that can be solved analytically. Then, for every
n ¡ N, we can obtain the following expression for qn:
qn =
d.
∑N
i=n+1Qi
Qn
. (2.2)
Let us interpret (2.2). If we rearrange this equation, multiplying both sides by
a small period of time ∆t, we obtain the following equation
∆t.Qn.qn = ∆t.d.
N∑
i=n+1
Qi . (2.3)
The left side of this equation is the number of people promoted from tier n in a
short period of time ∆t. On the right side we have the people in higher tiers that
die during this period of time ∆t. In order to supply sufficient employees to preserve
the number of agents in each tier, the number of promotions from a given tier must
be equal to the number of deaths in all higher tiers.
Although agents are identical they can supply different levels of effort. We
will treat the promotion process when there is a vacancy in a certain tier as a
lottery between all of the agents in the tier immediately below. We assume that
the probability of winning this lottery and being promoted may be different for
the various agents in the tier, depending on the individual effort supplied and the
distribution of effort supplied by the rest of the agents in the tier, which every
agent takes as given. Consequently, the agents know that supplying effort does not
guarantee promotion when there is a vacancy, but that is alters the probability of
promotion. This implies that the process is not a game in a strict sense, because
the strategies of the individual players are not mutually influenced. Nevertheless,
the distribution of strategies among the other agents in the same tier will affect the
strategy of a particular agent, in which case some concepts of Game Theory may be
considered.
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The literature takes different approaches to this type of lottery. The optimal
contract theory usually considers that the results of the work performed by agents
are stochastically dependent on the effort supplied. When the level of success of an
agentG˙s work is included in the promotion criteria, the process is clearly dependent
on the individual effort. Moreover, when the promotion criteria include worker
experience, the business network and other aspects that depend stochastically on
effort, the selection of promotion candidates depends stochastically on the individual
effort supplied. The literature on ranking tournaments, pioneered by Lazear and
Rosen (1981) and Green and Stokey (1983), is another important example of the
use of effort-dependent lotteries in order to incentize worker effort.
The probability rate of promotion of every individual agent in tier n depends
on his/her own effort, but also on the effort supplied by the other agents in the
same tier. Then, given a distribution of effort supplied by the other agents in the
same tier λ˜n, we note the individual probability rate of promotion of a given agent
supplying an effort λi as qin(λ
i, λ˜n). The mean probability of promotion of all agents
must be equal to the probability of promotion of any individual agent, so we have
the following condition:
qin(λ
i, λ˜n) = qn , (2.4)
where the upper bar is average among the agents in the tier n.
In some parts of this paper we will consider the simplifying assumption that the
individual probability rate of promotion depends on the distribution of effort of the
other agents in the same tier only through its mean, λ¯n. It is easy to show that the
only function that depends on individual effort and the average effort that verifies
the property (2.4) for all possible values of λ˜n is the linear probability rate given by:
qin(λ
i, λ¯n) =
a(λ¯n) + b(λ¯n).λ
i
a(λ¯n) + b(λ¯n).λ¯n
· qn ,
with a(λ¯n) ≥ 0. The particular value b(·) = 0 is the case in which the probability
of promotion is independent of the effort supplied by the agents. Another possible
requirement is that ∂
∂λi
qin(λ
i, λ¯n) > 0, which is equivalent to the condition that the
probability of promotion must increase with effort, which implies b(·) > 0. In this
case the probability rate of promotion becomes:
qin(λ
i, λ¯n) =
c(λ¯n) + λ
i
c(λ¯n) + λ¯n
· qn, with c(λ¯n) =
a(λ¯n)
b(λ¯n)
≥ 0 . (2.5)
In general, the probability rate of promotion under these assumptions when the
effort is 0 is given by c(λ¯n)
λ¯n+c(λ¯n)
· qn.
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An interesting, specific form of the function c(·) is the linear form c(s) = c.s,
with c a non -negative constant. The derivative of the probability of promotion with
respect the effort supplied is a decreasing function of c, so we interpret c as a measure
of the insensitivity of the prize of being awarded promotion. In fact, the derivative of
the individual probability of promotion with respect the inidividual effort supplied is
λ¯−1n
1+c
· qn. The larger the value of c, the less sensible the probability rate of promotion
qin(λ
i, λ¯n) to changes in the individual effort supplied, λ
i. Moreover, when c = 0 the
probability of promotion of an agent supplying nil effort is 0 meanwhile for a general
c is c
1+c
· qn, which is a decreasing function of c.
2.3 Utility and moral hazard
As we have seen, the firm owner pays the same wage to all of the agents in a given
tier. On the one hand, since the effort supplied by the agents cannot be observed
and they do not like to supply effort, there are incentives not to do so. On the
other hand, since the probability of promotion increases with the effort supplied,
if the expected utility of the agents in the next tier is higher than the expected
utility of their own tier, the agents have incentives to supply more effort in order
to gain promotion and improve their level of utility. Consequently, the agents solve
the maximization problem of deciding the amount of effort to supply by taking as
given the wages of all tiers, the structure of the firm, the utility of the next tier and
the effort supplied by the other agents in the tier.
The agents being hired have preferences regarding the effort they supply and
the wage they earn. In the Ramsey model (1928), the agents want to maximize in-
tertemporal utility throughout their working lives, perhaps sacrificing present utility
in order to improve future utility. Since agents do not know the exact point at which
they will O`dieO´, there is a discount term e−d.t, which takes into account the prob-
ability of being alive at time t. Then, when agents make decisions they first make
expectations about their expected utility and then reach a decision. An agent with
an expected wage4 w(t) and effort λi(t), for each t ∈ R+, has an expected utility
given by:
U(w, λi) =
∫
∞
0
e−d.t.u
(
w(t), λi(t)
)
.dt ,
where u(w, λi) is the instantaneous utility when the wage is w and the effort is λi.
We will assume that uw > 0, uλ < 0, uww < 0 and uλλ < 0.
4Expected in the sense that depends stochastically on the effort supplied but also in the sense
that the agents do not know when they will die, and then, although the expected wage is defined
for all times t ∈ R+, the wage will not be earned and the effort will not supplied after their death.
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The agents will determine their effort throughout their working life, λi(t), and
this decision will imply an expected wage at each point of time t, given by w(t). The
agents take the effort of the other agents as given. In general, the wage throughout
the working life of an agent, or at least his/her expected wage at each point of time,
will be a function of his/her effort. We can then suppose that agents have individual
expectations about their wage at each point, w(t, λi). The task faced by the agents
is to solve the following problem:
U = max
λi
∫
∞
0
e−d.t.u
(
w(t, λi), λi(t)
)
.dt ,
with a given initial wage w(0, λi). We define Un as the maximum utility of the people
who at time t = 0 are in the tier n, and then have as initial wage w(0, λi) = wn.
The expected utility presented above depends only on the initial tier of the agent,
which determines the initial value of the wage. The maximizer agent solves the same
problem of determining the effort he/she supplies depending on the tier to which
he/she belongs at any given point. We can then assume that each agent supplies
a constant effort when he /she is in a given tier, which may be different of the
effort of the other agents in the same tier. Moreover, agents in the same tier are
indistinguishable, in the sense that the decisions are taken on the basis of future
utility, and the same decisions affect all agents at any given point in time. Since the
agents maximize their expected utilities, they will choose the maximum expected
utility, so the expected utility of every agent in a given tier will be the same, given
by Un.
Now suppose that the expected utility of a certain tier n+ 1, Un+1, is given and
known. In this case, agents who are in the lower tier face the following maximization
problem, in the form of a Bellman equation:
Un = max
λi
[∫
∞
0
qin(λ
i, λ˜n).e
−qin(λ
i,λ˜n).t.
(∫ t
0
e−d.s.u(wn, λ
i).ds+ e−d.t.Un+1
)
.dt
]
= max
λi
[
u(wn, λ
i) + qin(λ
i, λ˜n).Un+1
d+ qin(λ
i, λ˜n)
]
, (2.6)
where λ˜n is the distribution of the efforts of the agents in the tier n, which each
agent takes as given, and qin(λ
i, λ˜n) is the probability rate of promotion of an agent
in the tier n who supplies an effort λi when the distribution of efforts in this tier is
λ˜n. This formula provides us with a relationship between the utilities of different
tiers, and will be useful in the future in providing a recurrent solution to the above
problem.
The agents in the highest tier, tier N , do not have any incentive to work because
they cannot be promoted further. These agents do not supply any effort and only
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leave this tier when they die. The utility of the agents in tier N is given by:
UN =
u(wn, 0)
d
. (2.7)
This formula can be used in equation (2.6), to obtain UN−1, and then UN−2,... We
can therefore obtain all of the utilities from the top to the bottom tier.
By using the expression for the expected utility (2.6) we determine that the
incentive compatibility condition for an agent belonging to the tier n who supplies
an effort λi and for an effort distribution on the tier λ˜n, can be expressed in the
following form:
u(wn, λ
i) + qin(λ
i, λ˜n).Un+1
d+ qin(λ
i, λ˜n)

=
u(wn,λ′i)+qin(λ
′i,λ˜n).Un+1
d+qin(λ
′i,λ˜n)
if λ′i ∈ λ˜n ,
≥ u(wn,λ
′i)+qin(λ
′i,λ˜n).Un+1
d+qin(λ
′i,λ˜n)
if λ′i /∈ λ˜n .
(2.8)
This expression establishes that if one an agent that chooses λi and another agent
chooses λ′i, their expected utility must be the same.
In this problem a stable state will be given by a set {wn, λ˜n, Qn} for n = 1, ..., N
that verifies equations (2.6) and (2.8). In this case, by using the incentive compat-
ibility condition, we see that the agents have no incentive to change the individual
effort supplied in any tier, taking as given the distribution of effort of the other
agents in the same tier, λ˜n. Therefore, every agent faces the following problem:
0 =
∂U(wn, λ
i)
∂λi
=
∂
∂λi
(
u(wn, λ
i) + qin(λ
i, λ˜n).Un+1
d+ qin(λ
i, λ˜n)
)
Finally, this relationship can be arranged in order to obtain an interpretable expres-
sion for the incentive compatibility condition:
− uλ(wn, λ
i) =
(d.Un+1 − u(wn, λ
i)) · ∂
∂λi
qin(λ
i, λ˜n)
d+ qin(λ
i, λ˜n)
. (2.9)
This equation means that the marginal increment of expectancy gain of utility (right
side) must be equal to the marginal disutility of increasing this amount of effort (left
side).
3 Symmetric Nash equilibrium
Now we assume that every agent can choose the effort he/she supplies among from
all the non-negative reals. The agents will only choose to increase the effort supplied
if the decision also increases their expected utility. The problem can therefore be
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considered a game in players are the agents trying to choose the best strategy, the
effort they supply, in order to maximize the outcome of the game, the expected
utility.
We consider the symmetric Nash equilibrium (SNE) of our problem, that is, a
situation in which all agents have individual incentives to supply the same effort.
The SNE is a fundamental concept in In many problems with identical players that
are analyzed using Game Theory. SNE is used to obtain results in many different
problems, that range from firms competition to consumer’s behavior. In this case,
we can consider the competition between the agents in each tier as a game with a
large number of identical players, where the strategy of each agent is the decision
of the individual effort he/she supplies. The final level of effort that is common
between the agents in a certain tier is not determined by either the firm owner or
the individual agents, but through a process of competition between the agents that
produces a state in which all agents individually decide to supply the same level of
effort as the others.
The fundamental equations that determine the decisions of the agents are (2.6)
and (2.9). These equations show that, when the agents choose the effort they supply
among all real values, they choose a local maximum. In our case, in a symmetric
solution, all agents supply the average effort of the tier considered, that is λi = λ¯n
and qin = qn. We assume a linear individual probability rate of promotion, as the
shown in (2.5). Moreover we choose a function c(·) with a linear form c(s) = c.s,
with c a non-negative constant.
We add to our model some simplifying assumptions that will allow us to obtain
analytical results. These assumptions are not too restrictive and the the results
obtained will be general and useful to interpret the firm structure in depth. We first
assume that the utility can be decomposed in two additive parts, one depending
(positively) on the wage and the other (negatively) on the effort. Moreover, in most
of the calculations, we will assume that these two parts take the form of a constant
relative risk aversion function. Then, the utility is given by
u(w, λ) = uw(w)− uλ(λ) = wα − B.λβ , (3.1)
that verify (uw)′ > 0, (uλ)′ > 0, (uw)′′ < 0 and (uλ)′′ > 0. In the particular form we
have 0 < α < 1, B > 0 and β > 1.
From (2.6) and (2.9) the wage of the tier n can be expressed as a function of the
expected utility Un and the effort λn in the following way
wn =
(
d.Un − B.((1 + c).β − 1).λ
β
n
) 1
α . (3.2)
This result allows us to implement the previously mentioned process to obtain re-
currently first the expression for the expected utility UN , then the expression for
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UN−1,... These utilities are obtained in terms of the efforts λ1, ..., λN−1 and the
highest tier expected utility UN . The result for the expected utility of the tier n is
Un = U1 + β.B.(1 + c).
n−1∑
i=1
λβi
qi
(3.3)
It is important to note that there is a bijection between these N variables and the
N wages that the firm owner tries to decide. Then, in general, this system provides
the solution of our problem.
3.1 At a single firm level
We first consider the single firm problem. A single firm takes the price of the good
produced and the nominal minimum wage of the economy (both indexed in monetary
units and not in product units) as given. Because the price level of the economy
is independent of the price of the good produced, the nominal and real wages are
equivalent in the decisions of the agents.
Assume that the firm maximizes the profits with a wage distribution such that
w1 > wb. If the firm owner decreases the lowest tier wage, this change does not
affect the expected utilities of the higher tiers. This implies that agents in the
higher levels supply exactly the same effort than before the changes. Otherwise,
equations (3.2) and (3.3) show that when the wage w1 decreases the average effort
of the tier 1 agents increases. Thus, a decrease in the wage of the level 1 increases
the production and decreases the costs. The conclusion is then that in the optimal
wage distribution the wage that the firm owner choose for the agents of the tier 1
is the minimum possible wage, i.e., the minimum wage, w1 = wb. This argument
cannot be used in the other tiers higher than 1, because changes the wage of the
tier n > 1 affect the expected utility of the agents in this tier, and then also affect
the effort supplied by the agents in all the lower tiers.
From (3.2) and (3.3) it is easy to observe that the wage of a certain tier does not
depend on the efforts of the lower levels. In particular, wN and wN−1 are the only
wages that depend on λN−1. From these statements we can easily obtain the FOC
for this effort turns, that turns to be specially simple. The FOC for λN−1 states
that:
wαN−1 = w
α
N −
(
dβ.αβ.pβ .Aβ
qβ−1N−1.
(
β.(1 + c).(d+ qN−1)− qN−1
)
.ββ.B.w
β.(1−α)
N
) 1
β−1
. (3.4)
To obtain this result we used qN−1.QN−1 = d.QN , that can be easily obtained from
(2.1). This process can be iterated to obtain the expression for the wages of all the
tiers, but unfortunately no concise analytical results can be obtained.
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In order to obtain analytical results we now consider a firm with only two tiers,
N = 2. Although the simplifying assumption of a firm (or the whole economy)
organized only two tiers may seem too simplified, it will allow us to obtain many
interesting analytical results. In fact, most of the models that consider more than
one role usually consider only two roles. Models with workers and firms, with highly
skilled and low skilled workers, models with producers and predators, models with
landowners and peasants,..., are models that help us to explain some observed facts
and that allow us to understand them better. Albeit the reality is far of being as
simple as only having two roles, because there are a lot of different roles and people
assuming many of them at the same time, simple models allow us to understand
better some aspects of the reality.
Now the effort supplied by the second tier agents is nil, λ2 = 0, because the
second is the highest tier and its agents have no incentives to work. Since no agent
of the tier 2 can be promoted, we have q2 = 0. Then, we can use the equation (2.2)
to obtain that the number of agents in the tiers 1 and 2 with respect q1, that are
respectively Q1 =
d
d+q1
· Q and Q2 =
q1
d+q1
· Q. Because in this case the parameter
q1 determines the organization of the firm we will call it the structure parameter.
The equation (3.4), for N = 2, establishes the relation between wb and w2. This
relation can not be inverted, that is, we can not write analytically w2(wb), but this
relation is implicitly established. From this result we can finally write the effort λ1
as a function of the wage w2:
λ1 =
(
d.α.p.A(
β.(1 + c).(d+ q1)− q1
)
.β.B.w1−α2
) 1
β−1
. (3.5)
This equation, considering the relation w2(wb) that can be obtained from (3.4),
implicitly defines the relation λ(wb). Note that λ1 and w2 are negatively correlated.
If the firms in one sector face extraordinary profits, new firms are attracted to
this sector, and then the price decreases, until the moment that profits are 0. The
0 profits price takes in general the following form:
p =
wb.d+ w2.q1
λ1.A.d
=
wb
λ1.A
+
w2.q1
λ1.A.d
.
Once we take in consideration that λ1 = λ1(q1) and w2 = w2(q1), it is easy to show
that this price function p(q1) is a U-shaped function, considering, and then it has
an interior minimum.
A natural parameter5 to represent the different variables is the number of agents
in the tier 2, given by Q2. This parameter ranges from 0 (all agents in the tier 1)
5Q2 is a parameter when the firm can not choose the structure of the firm. Nevertheless if
we consider that the firm owner can choose the number of agents in every tier, it turns to be a
variable.
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Figure 1: In (a) we represent the nominal wages and the efforts in a single firm.
In (b) are depicted the nominal and real productions of a single firm and the price
when profits are 0.
to Q (all agents in the tier 2). Moreover, Q2 is closely related with q1, what ensures
that determine the other variables uniquely. The number of agents in the tier 2 does
not allow us to write analytical expressions, but allows us to compare graphically
the different relevant variables. Moreover, the proportion of agents among the two
tiers many times may be given by specificities of the productive process of every
concrete good, what makes this variable more suitable when we analyze a concrete
good.
The figure 1 (a) corresponds to the wages and efforts in a single firm for every
given quantity of agents in the tier 2. In this figure the price used in every point
verifies the free entry condition, implying nil profits, price that depends on the
structure of the firm. Note that higher is the quantity of the workers in the tier 2,
higher is the effort of the agents in the tier 1, but lower is 2nd tier wage. Although for
high Q2 the premium is lower (U2 = w
2
2/d is lower) the increasing on the probability
rate of promotion q1 increases the competition among the agents, implying a high
effort.
In the figure 1 (b) we represent the nominal production, the real production
(measured in number of units produced) and the price of the product that implies
nil profits. We observe that the real production is a hill-shaped function of Q2. In
fact, larger is Q2, high is the effort the agents of the tier 1 supply, although the
difference of wages between the tiers decreases. This is due to the increase on the
probability of being promoted for high Q2, that enhances the incentives to work.
Nevertheless, for Q2 sufficiently high, the effect of the increase of the effort of the tier
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1 agents is counterbalanced by the effect of the decrease on the number of agents in
the tier 1. Then, the real production achieves a maximum and since then decreases.
There is a trade off between increase the effort of the agents of the tier 1, and then
have more productive working agents, and decrease the number of agents in the tier
1, decreasing the number of working agents. If the firm has an excessively large
number of agents in the tier 1 the small probability of being promoted discourages
the workers and they do not effort. If the firm has an excessively large number of
agents in the tier 2 then there is a large number of non-producing agents, making
the firm inefficient.
We observe that the nil profits price is different for different firm organizations.
Our model predicts differences of prices among different goods due the differences
in the organizations of the firm that produce them. Nevertheless, when firms can
choose their structure, firms will tend to choose Q2 near the structure that lowers
the price in order to be more competitive and then obtain additional profits. Then,
the competitive market makes the firms choose a structure that verifies the condition
∂p/∂Q2 = 0, that corresponds to the minimum observed in the figure 1 (b). It is
important to note that the maximum of the real production does not coincide in
general with the minimum price, and then the market does not maximize the real
production.
3.2 At the whole economy level
We now analyze the whole economy, that is, the effects observed when all firms
of all sectors are considered. When treat the whole economy, the price level is
obtained by weighting the consumption of every good by its price. Once the nominal
minimum wage is established by the government, the price of every good is set up
by the competition among firms. We assume that this process leads the economy
to an equilibrium, where perfectly competitive sectors supply goods at the price of
nil profits. This quantities and prices of equilibrium generate a price level, that
itself jointly with the nominal minimum wage establishes a real minimum wage.
Intuitively, when we aggregate the production the process is similar to consider only
one good produced, and then the agents are paid in real terms with respect to this
good.
In order to study the aggregate production we model the whole economy as a
single firm behaving facing nil profits. This firm produces a good that is sold at
price p, that coincides with the price index. Real wages are obtained by dividing
nominal wages by the price level. The agents will make the decisions about choosing
the effort supplied taking in account the real wages of every tier. In fact, at firm
level these two wages where exogenously proportional, because every single can not
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Figure 2: In (a) are depicted real wages and the efforts when the whole economy
is considered. In (b) are depicted the average instantaneous utility in a single firm
case (u¯sf) and when the whole economy is considered (u¯we).
influence the price level of the economy as given. Now the price of the aggregated
good does influence the real wages. It is easy to show that the formulas presented
for the wages and the effort, (3.5) and (3.4), are now valid by replacing the nominal
wages by real wages.
In the figure 2 (a) we observe the different real wages and the consequent ef-
forts reached when the whole economy is considered, as functions of the number of
agents in the tier 2. It is easy to show that does not depends on the nominal value
established by the government. In fact, when the government changes the minimum
wage, competition among firms adjust the price level in a way that wnb /p remains
constant. If the nominal minimum wage wnb /p is held exogenously, the real minimum
wage is simply wrb = w
n
b /p. Because, as we can see in the figure 1 the competitive
price diverges both when Q2 → 0 and when Q2 → Q, the real minimum wage in
these limits is 0. Moreover, in this limit the real production goes to 0, and then
the real wage of the tier 2 agents also approaches to 0. This convergence among
the two real wages implies that the effort supplied by the tier 1 agents also decrease
to 0 when Q2 → 1, differently from the single firm effort. When firm owners can
choose the structure of the firms, competition moves the economy to the minimum
of the price function. In this case, this point coincides with the maximum of the
real minimum wage. In this case, the free market maximizes the purchasing power
of the less well paid workers.
When Q2 is such that the real minimum wage is maximal it is easy to show that
the effort supplied by the agents of the tier 1 an increasing function of Q2. Then,
the instantaneous utility of the tier 1 agents is also a decreasing function of Q2.
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The instantaneous utility of the agents in the tier 2 is also decreasing, because wr2 is
strictly decreasing on Q2. Then, this point may seem nonPareto efficient, because we
can decrease Q2 an this increases the instantaneous utility of both the tier 1 agents
and the tier 2 agents, and then we make everyone better off. Nevertheless, the utility
that the agents consider when they make decisions is not the instantaneous utility,
but the expected utility. The expected utility of the agents in the tier 1 can increase
with Q2 because the decrease of the instantaneous utilities can be compensated by
the increase of the probability of being promoted, caused by the increasing of agents
in the tier 2.
From (2.6) we can obtain the form of the expected utilities of the first tier
workers:
U1 =
u(w1,λ1)
d
+ q1.U2
d+ q1
=
u(w1, λ1)
d
·
d
d+ q1
+
u(w2, 0)
d
·
q1
d+ q1
=
u(w1, λ1)
d
·
Q1
Q
+
u(w2, 0)
d
·
Q2
Q
=
u¯
d
,
where we have used the fact that the all the agents in the tier 1 supply effort. The
expected utility of the workers that belong to the firm in the tier 1, U1, coincides
with the average instantaneous utility of the economy, u¯, divided by the death rate
d. Note that even when the instantaneous utilities of all the agents in the economy
decrease with Q2, an increase of the number of agents in the tier 2 (with high
instantaneous utility) can compensate the decrease of the instantaneous utilities,
and make the average utility rise.
The figure 2 (b) represents the different average utilities in the single firm and at
the whole economy level depending on Q2. Like nominal and real productions, the
average utilities behave very different in a single firm and at the whole economy level.
In a single firm the average utility is a increasing function of Q2, like the nominal
production, while the average utility when the whole economy is considered is a hill-
shaped function, like the real production. An important consequence of the form of
these curves is that single firms tend to prefer to have a regulated structure defined
by the government, with Q2 as higher as possible. Note that when a sector is not
regulated and firms can choose the structure, Q2 tends to the point where minimizes
the competitive price, and then lowers the average utility of the firm. As we have
seen in the figure 1 (b), when Q2 is fixed high the price and the nominal production
are high and, what is more important, the average utility of the members of this
sector is high. But if it is applied to the whole economy, the price level increases
and the nominal wages decrease, making the whole average utility decrease. It is an
example of the fact that what is better for every part of the economy (a regulation
with high Q2 for a sector) can be worse for the whole economy.
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Conclusions
The model we have presented helps us to understand organization of firms and the
wage distribution between the different jobs tiers.
When variables that are important to determine the level of production cannot
be observed by the firm owner, he/she must establish a system of incentives to
ensure that the agents provide a certain level of effort. We modelled this process a
a promotion “lottery” among agents, where the probability of promotion depends
stochastically on the effort individually supplied. This is a realistic assumption
because the agents know that their success in the firm depends on the effort they
supply, but not in a deterministic way. Agents in the same tier compete for available
vacancies in the next tier. This element of competition ensures that agents supply
effort, even though it is not directly observable.
Competition between firms implies that prices decrease until the moment that
profits are 0. Because this competitive price is strongly related to the organiza-
tional structure, firms that produce similar goods will have similar structures and
wages. Furthermore, technological changes in the productive process that change
the organization towards the price minimizer scheme will be favored by the mar-
ket, because firms that initially adopt of this kind of technologies will have positive
profits temporally.
We have seen that when firms can be restructured, that is, if the productive
process allows different organization schemes, the structure is changed in order to
decrease the prices and then be more competitive. This process makes firms more
similar, because there is an unique organization scheme that minimizes the price.
When it is applied at the whole economy level the election of the structure coincides
with the maximization of the real wage of the agents in the tier 1. When the firm
owner chooses the structure of the firm there is a tradeoff, Increasing the number
of agents in higher tiers produces a decrease in the number of working agents, but
also an increase in the effort supplied by them, The firm owner should compensate
the agency problem of the higher tiers with high incentives in the lower tiers.
Firms in a sector are better off when there are regulations that increase the
expected quantity of high tier workers. This can be done by regulating the structure
or the relative wage among tiers, because although they make 0 profits we have seen
that the average utility is increased. Although this kind of regulations generates
productive inefficiencies, they increase the nominal output and the welfare of the
regulated sector, by rising the price of the good. Nevertheless, as we have seen,
when these regulations applied to the whole economy the result is a decrease in the
overall welfare, and the economy becomes inefficient.
Although the model presented is simple, specially with the assumption of firms
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with only two tiers, it is helpful to understand a wide range of observed effects. We
modelled the conflict of interests between workers and firms, the tradeoffs in the
hierarchical organization, the behavior of a single firm and the whole economy,...
This first step opens the door to future generalizations of the model, to be able test
the predictions that it implies.
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